Private external funding of universities: Blind alley or new opening? by Badelt, Christoph
Vol.:(0123456789)
Review of Managerial Science
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-019-00365-0
1 
ORIGINAL PAPER
Private external funding of universities: Blind alley or new 
opening?
Christoph Badelt1,2
Received: 27 May 2019 / Accepted: 21 October 2019 
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
Of late, the problems of private external, or third-party funding of universities have 
been the subject of much debate, even at universities of economics and business. 
Given the constraints on government funding, politicians are looking increasingly 
to this source, with university leaders (rectors, deans, department heads) frequently 
being set targets for increasing income from it. Yet it is important to distinguish 
between different types of external funds. Moreover, their advantages and potential 
drawbacks must be weighed up. This paper seeks to do that, against the background 
of the author’s more than 13  years as Rector of Vienna University of Economics 
and Business (WU). Much of the paper thus draws rather less on theory than on that 
practical experience.
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1  External funding: towards a typology
1.1  From donations to business investments
The arrangements under which universities may receive external funds form a spec-
trum ranging from business deals at one end to gifts at the other. Depending on their 
location on this spectrum, there are massive variations in the way such monies are 
treated by the law or regarded from a university policy standpoint.1
A gift, or donation, is generally an act of pure philanthropy. In this case, money is 
given to a university with no conditions attached. In direct contrast, under a contrac-
tual business deal the university must provide a quid pro quo which it and the fund-
ing party consider to be equal in value to the funds received. Universities enter into 
many different forms of such arrangements. For example, they may provide continu-
ing education in return for fees. Or they may be paid for carrying out commissioned 
research projects that have been previously defined and costed.
The numerous hybrids of these two archetypal arrangements raise serious con-
siderations for tax law, corporate law and anti-corruption legislation. They comprise 
the many different types of fundraising or sponsorship under which private financi-
ers provide universities with money and receive something in return. That ‘some-
thing’ might, for example, be the advertising benefit derived from the display of a 
company’s logo. The value of such a benefit is often hard to establish, and may well, 
quite intentionally, be less than the sum received by the university. That is true of 
support given to seminars or one-off university events, but may also apply to more 
extensive, longer-term sponsorship arrangements, for instance the sponsoring of lec-
ture halls. Even the award of honorary degrees in direct or indirect response to the 
grant of larger amounts falls into this category.
Here it is important to point out a common source of terminological confusion. 
The specialist literature in English restricts the term ‘sponsorship’ to cases where 
the benefit received by the sponsor (e.g. through display of a plaque featuring a 
company name) is of lower value than the funds received by the university. By con-
trast, under Austrian law the German term ‘Sponsoring’ is used specifically where 
the two values are equal. Should that not be the case, a public university could even 
face prosecution under anti-corruption laws.
2  The uses to which funds may be put
The value of private external funds to a university is affected by the extent to which 
they are earmarked for a particular purpose. From a recipient university’s point of 
view, the optimal situation is undoubtedly that where funding is provided without 
any stipulations as to its use, so that the university is free to use the money how and 
when it wants.
1 The rector of an Austrian university is its chief executive, equivalent to a vice-chancellor in the UK or 
a university president in the US.
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In some cases, the purpose for which funds are intended is stipulated in very 
broad terms only, so that there is considerable discretion as to how they are actually 
applied. Thus a chair in a particular subject area may be endowed without stipulat-
ing exactly what its holder must work on. Alternatively, external funds may be des-
ignated for awarding grants or providing support to members of particular groups 
(e.g., for the advancement of women). Within these parameters the university can 
then pursue its own policy goals.
On other occasions, universities have much less freedom in applying external 
funds, which may be earmarked to finance certain specified activities. For example, 
the classes WU Wien offers during vacations (its so-called Summer and Winter Uni-
versities) are funded by grants from firms. Although the funding does not cover the 
full cost of the classes, it is agreed that these will include a reference to the donor 
firms.
3  Providers and recipients of external funds
In practice, the issues associated with external funding vary with the institutional 
and legal status of its source, the funder, and its recipient. In the simplest case, the 
former is an individual who makes a donation from their private fortune. This situa-
tion poses the fewest technical problems because the decision processes involved are 
straightforward, and there is no specific requirement for accountability to third par-
ties. It arises typically when the donor has a strong emotional attachment to the uni-
versity concerned, for example as an alumnus. Frequently, before providing funds, 
he or she has had a lengthy personal relationship with the university’s authorities or 
with individual university members. The provision of funds by a foundation, espe-
cially a charitable one, can be similarly unproblematic if its charter stipulates exactly 
the purpose to which the funds are to be put, and if the procedures to be followed, 
including those for audit, are subject to clearly defined rules.
The issues become more complex if the funding person or institution does not 
own the funds and must therefore consider the need to account for their decision to 
third parties, for example a supervisory board. This situation can arise with asso-
ciations as well as companies, whose CEO and other managers must observe the 
relevant corporate governance rules in granting funds to universities. In essence that 
applies whether or not the university provides a quid pro quo in return, although the 
nature of accountability or audit is generally different in the two cases.
Also worthy of mention here is funding bequeathed as a legacy. In this case, the 
deceased person’s executors must follow the rules that are usually set out in the will. 
Here too the bequest will generally have been preceded by a lengthy relationship 
between the university and the deceased. Thus, for example, effectively cultivating 
alumni links can lead to a university benefiting in this way.
As regards the possible recipients of funds, these may be individuals (e.g. 
researchers), university departments and institutes, or university management acting 
on behalf of their university. There are considerable practical distinctions between 
the three cases. In particular, the implications under the Austrian Universities Act 
are different, which is of especial importance when a service is provided in return 
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for external funds. If these are received by an individual, for instance to finance a 
research project, then he or she is personally responsible for providing the agreed 
quid pro quo. On the other hand, if a chair is endowed, then it is usual and legally 
correct that the university management assume responsibility for establishing the 
professorship. As soon as a professor is appointed, however, these managers can no 
longer be responsible for his or her activities. It is therefore necessary to devise a 
way of defining the responsibilities of the chair’s occupant—which can cause very 
significant complications for the university.
4  External funding in kind
Although in common parlance ‘external funds’ are generally understood to mean 
cash, it is actually perfectly usual for universities to receive such funding in kind, 
in the form of rooms, documentation for meetings, IT or other equipment, vehicles 
and so on. The promotional value to the provider of such material donations is vastly 
increased if they can be clearly identified with the donor (e.g. by a firm’s logo on 
furniture or IT equipment); attaching an acknowledgment of their source is the best 
alternative, but a poor one. From the university’s perspective, it is often easier to 
attract funding in kind rather than in cash since it is easier for the provider firm to 
justify such donations internally.
In the broadest sense, seconding staff to universities can also be seen as a form 
of private external funding. In such cases, research assistants or administrative staff, 
for example, employed by the funding institution (e.g. a firm or professional associa-
tion) carry out tasks for the university concerned. This raises complex issues relat-
ing to labour law and university legislation.
5  The reasons why universities seek external funding
It seems natural to assume that the primary motivation for universities to seek exter-
nal funding is financial. And, indeed, whenever public funding is scarce or unreli-
able, it is vital that universities also have access to alternative, private sources. In 
these circumstances, funds which are not earmarked for any specific purpose are 
particularly attractive as they may be used flexibly to augment or complement the 
total budget.
From a commercial perspective, it makes sense for a university to reduce its 
dependence on individual sources of funding, even if it is hard for public universi-
ties to do so. As a result, university leaders are constantly in search of external funds 
to stabilise or enhance the budgetary situation. They are especially keen to attract 
undesignated funding, the argument they typically use being the high reputation of 
their university or a particular department.
However, the opposite approach is also found. In other words, the university’s 
aim may be to attract funding for a concrete project, such as the construction of a 
new building or laboratory, or the establishment of a particular academic unit. Here, 
the search for external funding is aimed at enabling the realisation of some cherished 
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project that otherwise could not be financed. Experience shows this approach to be 
more fruitful than seeking non-earmarked funding. The reason is that the project’s 
inherent attractiveness can be used to persuade potential donors, who also have the 
prospect of seeing the material result of their efforts. Thus it is easier to obtain fund-
ing for a specific research project—especially if the donor is also convinced of the 
pressing need for it—than funding for general, unspecified research.
On occasion, this approach to fundraising is also used to provide the basic fund-
ing for entire academic units, such as research institutes or laboratories. A good 
example is the Competence Center for Central and Eastern Europe at WU. For many 
years it was funded by companies with a particular interest in research about the 
region, but which were also interested in recruiting graduates from there or prepared 
to work there.
External funding acquires a special character when it is provided in the context 
of a long-standing relationship. In such cases, the recipient university’s efforts are 
focused on maintaining this long-term cooperation, which extends far beyond the 
purely financial. Thus on its new campus WU Vienna has introduced a system of 
lecture-hall sponsorship, which was intended not only to raise funds but also to doc-
ument cooperations with various major Austrian companies. Indeed, for universities 
of economics and business it is essential to be involved in partnerships with impor-
tant firms.
If a university has a lengthy, stable relationship with a major enterprise, then, 
within that context, it is common practice to establish each year a particular use 
for funding, and sometimes also the extent of overall support. Cooperation then 
generally extends beyond the financial sphere. It may aim, for example, to identify 
research topics of relevance for professional practice or to obtain access to data.
One potential side effect of a lengthy support agreement that is not to be under-
rated is that it ensures the maintenance of personal contacts between top execu-
tives and university leaders. Thus WU benefits from a number of foundations set 
up by large companies, in particular financial service firms. The support received 
from them may not be especially large in monetary terms. However, the founda-
tions’ charters ensure that leaders of the endowing company and the university meet 
regularly at board meetings to exchange experiences. This serves automatically as a 
means of maintaining contacts.
6  Positive experiences with providers of private external funds
The types of possible relationships between universities and private funders are 
legion, but a few have proved to be especially advantageous for universities. The 
ideal situation from their point of view is one where they can rely for the support of 
their activities on foundations that operate with a long-term horizon, and may even 
be set up expressly for that purpose. In WU’s case, there are two such associations: 
the “WU Board of Trustees” (Kuratorium zur Förderung der Wirtschaftsuniversität 
Wien) and the “WU Anniversary Foundation” (“WU-Jubiläumsstiftung”).
The university then benefits from an endowment, a stock of invested capital 
that generates a reliable income stream—even if in times of low interest rates the 
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stream may run rather dry. It can plan on the basis of this steady inflow and usu-
ally also has a say in how the funds are used. Meanwhile, the foundation’s deci-
sion-makers also help in maintaining contacts with corporate leaders and public 
figures. Supporting institutions of this kind also exist at the level of departments 
or other academic units, albeit mostly on a smaller scale. The money received can 
be used for purposes whose funding from public sources is impossible, politically 
undesired or inappropriate for some other reason.
Another highly successful way of acquiring external funds is through long-
term cooperation arrangements with individual companies. These are usually 
governed by a framework agreement that lays down the extent of the support 
to be provided and the basic aims of cooperation. This is then implemented by 
means of more detailed annual provisions that establish the funds to be granted 
in a particular period. In most cases, the funder is anxious to achieve visibility 
at university level, be it by holding events there, by sponsoring a conference or 
series of lectures, etc.
A particular example of long-term external funding is the endowed chair. In prac-
tice, such arrangements are truly successful only under certain circumstances. Expe-
rience at WU suggests that endowments are effective above all where they comple-
ment or reinforce existing strengths or priorities. Thus an endowed chair makes most 
impact when the university itself invests in it or in its immediate subject area. Chairs 
that are not anchored in this way, but set up merely because some funder is prepared 
to provide the necessary money, are generally less successful since continued fund-
ing is very rarely guaranteed.
In Austria, universities are in the position to anchor endowed chairs as just 
described because they enjoy the autonomy to establish professorships within their 
own area of activity. Prior to the 2002 Universities Act, they did not have that right, 
and so lacked autonomy when the first endowed chairs were established in the coun-
try. It therefore made perfect sense to establish such professorships in areas where no 
chair had been officially approved or funded. At that time, they were an unbureau-
cratic way of being innovative.
To give an example, the first endowed chair established at WU was that of Start-
up Research and Entrepreneurship. It was set up at a time when professors’ posts 
had to feature in the federal government’s personnel plan, which in practice meant 
that it could often take years to establish them. It was therefore natural that private 
funders free from budgetary and bureaucratic restrictions should have the role of 
setting up new chairs quickly. In the present legal situation, it is a university’s own 
responsibility to identify such needs and provide the necessary funds. Its initiative 
can then be supported and strengthened by the endowment of a chair.
7  Problems and criticism
The exaggerated hopes often expressed in political debate about the beneficial 
effects of private external funding generally ignore a number of problem areas. 
These will be summarised in the remainder of the paper.
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7.1  The lack of a philanthropic tradition in Austria
Unlike the English-speaking world, Austria has no strong tradition of charitable sup-
port by wealthy patrons, and none at all in the areas of science and research. That is 
especially regrettable because funding that universities receive free of conditions as 
to its use is of particular value and gives rise to virtually no problems.
There are various reasons for this limited willingness to make donations in the 
service of science. One factor not to be underestimated is that, relative to Britain and 
America, private fortunes are smaller and the number of genuinely rich individuals 
much lower in Austria. Connected to that is the lack of a philanthropic tradition, 
itself the result of a different conception of the respective responsibilities of the pub-
lic and private sectors. In the US, for example, a well organised ‘independent sector’ 
brings together many types of potential private donors, both individuals and cor-
porate bodies, and sees its role as representing the interests of ‘philanthropy’. That 
alone shows the depth of the cultural gulf that separates Austria from the English-
speaking world.
The comparatively low level of philanthropic activity in Austria can also be seen 
as resulting from the relevant legal provisions. For the legislation relating to private 
foundations is primarily concerned with the transfer of capital from one generation 
to the next, rather than with its accumulation in the interest of public service. The 
preferential treatment for tax purposes currently accorded to donations designed to 
support science and research cannot compensate for this basic orientation of the law 
on foundations. That is also the reason why consideration has been given on vari-
ous occasions to reforming the legislation in order to provide new incentives for 
philanthropy.
A third ground for the relatively low willingness to donate is associated with the 
strong role of the state in general, and the high level of taxation in particular. In Aus-
tria, almost half of any additional income is taken in tax, and potential funders such 
as banks, in particular, are additionally subject to special levies, such as the ‘bank 
tax’ imposed for a number of years following the financial crisis. Against that back-
ground, it is hardly surprising that potential funders often feel that they have already 
‘done their bit’ for the community by paying taxes. This feeling also explains why 
the ever louder demands for greater private engagement, for example in discussions 
of policy towards the universities, have sometimes met with a sceptical response 
from those potentially affected.
7.2  Problems with the ‘sustainability’ of external funding
Private external funds for university activities are often regarded by funders as seed 
capital, with the expectation that before too long the university (or ‘the govern-
ment’) will take on responsibility for ongoing funding. Endowed chairs, for instance, 
are generally funded for a specified period (very often 5 years). By the end of this 
period, so it is assumed, the university must be in a position either to ensure perma-
nent funding by restructuring its own budget or, alternatively, to secure continuing 
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financial support from elsewhere (in Austria, within the framework of its three-
yearly funding agreement with the federal government).
This approach is logical from funders’ point of view. First, it often matches their 
understanding of their own role as that of providing a kick-start for particular activi-
ties. Second, funders usually have no wish to make an open-ended financial com-
mitment. For firms, even a five-year one is often risky. And even foundations, which 
finance support from their capital stock, frequently balk at constraining their finan-
cial room for manoeuvre too greatly by making long-term commitments.
This leaves universities on the horns of a dilemma. For public funds too are 
increasingly often granted only ‘on a project basis’—and so for a limited period. 
This approach is meant to incentivise universities to continuously monitor whether 
their expenditure is being employed sensibly and to create a positive climate for 
structural change within them. This may make sense in financial management terms. 
But it overlooks the fact that top class researchers are interested only in tenured 
posts and are thus simply not available for fixed-term projects. Nor is it only a ques-
tion of individual researchers. A department whose funding is assured only for a few 
years at a time, and whose existence is therefore called into question every three or 
4 years, can never offer an attractive environment for excellent basic research.
Of course, private firms outside the world of research must also live with the 
uncertainty that comes from having to ensure their existence by generating returns 
in the market. That is why they usually have limited sympathy for universities’ case. 
However, companies tend to react to a fall in returns by adjusting personnel numbers 
accordingly—that is, by firing staff. Here is where the comparison between univer-
sities and commercial enterprises comes to an end. Suppose that a university faced 
with a decline in its income chose to dismiss good, experienced researchers, some 
perhaps professors. It would very soon lose its reputation as an employer of top 
research staff—quite simply because the best universities and research institutes can 
offer secure, tenured contracts. In other words, adopting from the private sector the 
practice of frequently adjusting staff numbers would rob universities of their ability 
to compete.
7.3  Governance problems relating to external funding
As was set out in Section I above, the recipients of external funds may be individual 
members of university staff, departments or other academic units, or a university 
itself—which in practice means its management team. Austrian law includes various 
provisions to support and promote this variety. Thus Section 26 of the Universities 
Act provides for members of a university’s staff to attract external funds in a per-
sonal capacity and to make use of them, but to carry out the activities concerned 
(e.g. a research project) at their university, provided they pay for using its infrastruc-
ture. Even so, funds acquired under the conditions of Section 26 remain the property 
of the person who attracted them. By contrast, Section 27 of the same Act estab-
lishes that, while funding paid to a university unit such as a department may be used 
by the recipient, its legal owner is the university.
1 3
Private external funding of universities: Blind alley or new…
These provisions make it easier for researchers to pursue their activities at a uni-
versity (and not, say, in an association or a commercial organisation). On the other 
hand, they give rise to problems that are sometimes both odd and hard to grasp. 
Moreover, they become more serious the more external funding is attracted. For 
example, staff recruited with such funds are university employees. Consequently, if 
a party to a contract governing a Section 27 project fails to fulfil their obligations, or 
does so tardily, then the university concerned may have to resort to time-consuming, 
costly dismissal procedures in order to rid itself of a financial burden. Seen from 
outside, it is also hard to understand that a university may have considerable assets 
on its books over which it is unable to exercise any control (e.g. as yet unused exter-
nal funds for a Section 27 research project). It is not uncommon that universities are 
forced to take on the role of a bank vis-à-vis their employees, for instance when their 
overall budget is called upon to resolve liquidity problems caused by an external 
funder’s poor payment practices.
Given these issues, external funding can frequently become a source of friction 
and problems for universities. One obvious example of the former is the need—
indeed the legal requirement—to make a contribution to the university’s overhead 
costs out of such funds. This is often seen by those affected as a sort of ‘tax’ on the 
funds, although it is actually only a matter of cost transparency. On the other hand, 
external funders sometimes—as is often the case with research funding—require 
universities to bear some or all overheads themselves. This can have the strange 
effect that they come under financial pressure because some of their academic units 
have been particularly successful in attracting external funds.
From time to time, individual departments may even compete with their own uni-
versity’ management team for sponsorship from private funders, commercial ones in 
particular. This can only be avoided by setting strict guidelines for handling contacts 
outside the university, something easier said than done.
Finally, we should mention another aspect of governance connected with external 
funding issues. In countries where private funds make up an important part of uni-
versities’ income it is common for university leaders, in particular chief executives 
such as presidents or vice-chancellors, to devote a major portion of their working 
time—well over half—to fundraising. Indeed, efforts to cultivate contacts over the 
long term also make heavy demands on their private lives. This situation reflects a 
very different understanding of what leading a university involves. Unlike Austrian 
rectors, presidents or vice-chancellor’s are only marginally involved in day-to-day 
academic affairs, which are often the responsibility of another, such as a pro-vice-
chancellor or provost. In Austria, such a distribution of responsibilities is still very 
unusual.
8  External funds and matching grants
Austrian politicians have recently taken to offering so-called ‘matching grants’ as 
an incentive to attract external funding. In other words, a public authority commits 
itself, for instance, to matching the funds attracted out of public coffers. On occa-
sion, such commitments are made only to certain organisations (e.g. IST Austria), 
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which distorts competition between research institutions. In any case, it has difficult 
to verify empirically the claim that they actually increase the amounts of external 
funding raised by individual universities. And they certainly generate side effects 
that are either undesirable or hard to monitor.
As regards the recipients of such support, rather than increasing a university’s 
external fundraising efforts, matching grants may serve merely to shift them towards 
those areas where such grants are available. Thus existing external funds may be 
crowded out by those which government has committed to matching. This will have 
the—perhaps desired—structural impact of shifting a university’s priorities towards 
a particular field. But it need not necessarily raise the amount of external funding 
attracted since the university’s fundraising efforts are simply reoriented.
From the point of view of public authorities, matching grants are very much a 
two-edged sword. In their pure form these involve an open-ended legal commitment, 
the total size of which cannot be foreseen in advance. As a result, authorities are 
unable to plan reliably, and so long-term or large-scale programmes of this type are 
rare. The only alternative is to cap the total amount of funding available from the 
outset, and then divide this total among universities according to the external funds 
these raise. But then universities are rewarded for the relative size of the external 
funds they raise, not the absolute amount. That was the approach adopted in the 
original Austrian legislation with the establishment of a so-called ‘budget formula’, 
and it was again apparent in the arrangements for so-called ‘Higher Education Struc-
tural Funds’. How this aspect of university funding is to be regulated in the longer 
term remains unclear.
9  Private external funding and funders’ influence on teaching 
and research
One of the strongest arguments against the use of private money to fund univer-
sities’ activities is that the providers of such funds could so influence the results 
of research or the content of degree programmes that the independence of teaching 
and research might be compromised. This is undoubtedly one of the central issues 
related to external funding, and is best considered by breaking it down into its com-
ponent aspects.
First, it is a fact that whenever a particular activity—be it a research project, a 
conference or a research institute—is funded privately, then the funder inevitably 
exercises some influence, specifically over the choice of subject. For example, what 
is investigated, or not investigated, depends at least in part on the funder—and that 
can be problematic. Yet this issue arises not only when the funder comes from the 
commercially-oriented private sector, but also in the case of funding from the non-
profit sector or from public bodies. The desire to influence is no weaker in these 
areas than in private industry. The problem can be avoided only if a university has 
exclusive decision-making rights with regard to the funds it raises, as is the case 
with lecture hall sponsorship or funding from associations whose raison d’être is to 
support it.
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A second aspect of the issue is apparent above all when a chair is endowed. It 
is the danger that the endowing person or institution will wish to be involved in 
the choice of the new professor, however this wish may be expressed. Sections 98 
and 99 of the Austrian Universities Act, however, stipulate clear procedures for 
the appointment of professors that are designed to guarantee a balance of powers 
between certain organs of the university (the appointment commission of the sen-
ate) and its head, the Rector. There is no provision for any external involvement, 
for instance that of a funder, which would thus be illegal.
At WU, there has been no instance as yet of a funder wishing to condition an 
appointment to an endowed chair. It is nonetheless important that the university 
makes this principle clear in the negotiations that lead to an endowment. On the 
other hand, it is sensible and helpful in building confidence between partners that 
the funder is bound into the ongoing appointment procedure by being kept appro-
priately informed. After all, it makes no sense to appoint someone who from their 
very first meeting is set on a confrontation course with the funder. In other words, 
the problem can be resolved only by a good dose of social intelligence.
The third, and probably most commonly occurring aspect of the influence 
issue is the possibility the funder or funders may determine, or help to determine 
the nature of university activities, and thus the results of a research project or the 
central message of a teaching programme. Put crudely, is it possible for a private 
funder to ‘buy’ a university together with its teaching and research? This question 
is central to the ethics of external funding. And it is one that must be faced not 
only by universities as organisations, for example when they accept a major dona-
tion for a new building or substantial private-sector funding to establish a ‘coop-
eration’ with a company. It also affects individual researchers, who may succeed 
in attracting funds for a particular research project.
It is a dilemma that cannot be completely resolved. However, we can state a 
few principles that can reduce the danger that research results will be manipu-
lated or the content of teaching influenced. They include the following.
• The contracts under which support is provided, or any other agreements that 
form the basis on which external funding is granted, must be fully transparent.
• Contractual agreement must exist that any results achieved will be published 
and thus made available to academic debate.
• The identity of the funder(s) of a particular piece of research work must be 
absolutely clear to the academic community.
A further point is that less pressure is exercised on the content of research pro-
jects or teaching if external funding for them is made available, not directly to the 
project leader or the member of teachings staff concerned, but to the university as 
a body, as is the case with endowments or lecture hall sponsorship. Nevertheless, 
suspicions or concerns about funders’ influence on research and teaching content 
will never be fully allayed. It is thus all the more important that all issues relating 
to the private funding of universities be handled within a clear regulatory frame-
work that establishes the public purse as the main source of finance for public 
universities.
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A brief final example will help to explain this principle. In 2013, WU moved to 
a new campus funded with public money (the total cost was just under €500 mil-
lion). At the same time, a sponsorship scheme for lecture halls and other spaces was 
set up. In return for providing funds, Austrian companies could have a lecture hall 
or library space named after them, or at least have their support acknowledged next 
to the room concerned. Once the campus was opened, this scheme brought WU an 
annual income of around €1.2 million, while also giving the companies involved 
clear visibility. Yet the University also wished to make clear the relative importance 
of private and public funding to the project as a whole. To that end, a plaque was 
erected in the main hall of WU’s Learning Center with the following text:
“The Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU) wishes to express 
its gratitude to the public, whose contributions have enabled the building of 
this campus. Without public funding, it would have been impossible to realize 
one of the fundamental principles enshrined in the Austrian Constitution: the 
freedom of university research and teaching.”
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